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Introduction  
 
Pre-packaged insolvency proceedings have been with us for some time now, but in the last 
decade or so the number of pre-packaged proceedings has increased dramatically across 
many jurisdictions in the European Union. From a debtor’s perspective prepacks can be 
attractive for a wide range of reasons, for instance the process is quick, secret and 
inexpensive. On the other hand, from an apprehensive creditor’s perspective, a variety of 
concerns arise primarily due to the lack of transparency of the process. However, 
notwithstanding the criticisms and concerns prepacks have repeatedly received support and 
ultimately validation as a helpful rescue tool.  
In light of prepacks having been widely adopted by a number of European jurisdictions as a 
rescue tool, the aim of this paper is to provide a comparative analysis of the approach towards 
prepacks. The paper will consider the different approach adopted in the very creditor- 
friendly UK and compare it with the approach taken in the Netherlands. Particular emphasis 
will be placed on the role of secured creditors in the prepack process, banks in particular.  
Moreover, the paper will briefly examine whether prepacks are proving to be a useful social 
policy tool. With particular regard to the UK, it could be argued that the preservation of 
employment and as a result the greater social prosperity is the explanation behind the support 
of prepacks. A comparison will then be drawn with the Dutch prepack regime and the paper 
shall assess whether or not preservation of employment is also a driving force behind the 
increased endorsement of the prepack practice.  
The rise of prepacks in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom prepacks fall within the context of administration proceedings. A 
prepack administration involves a pre-arranged sale of the distressed business, which will be 
executed immediately after the formal appointment of the administrator.  
The Enterprise Act 2002 (hereafter EA) 1  strengthened the rescue ethos of the United 
Kingdom by streamlining the administration procedure and effectively making it a key 
restructuring tool. In particular, the Enterprise Act introduced revolutionary changes to what 
was previously a time-consuming, expensive and complex administration procedure. The Act 
contains a series of reforms designed to make administration an attractive restructuring 
device.  
However, it is important to note that the Enterprise Act does not make specific reference to 
prepacks. Instead prepacks developed as a market technique to promote corporate rescue, but 
no legislation is directly applicable to them. A prepack typically involves a sale of a 
distressed business, seamlessly prepared outside of formal administration proceedings, which 
is executed immediately after the formal appointment of an administrator. 
As previously stated, a prepack sale, albeit not expressly regulated by the relevant legislation, 
nevertheless falls within the context of administration proceedings. It is therefore important at 
this stage to provide a brief analysis of the applicable law.   
 
                                                          
1Pursuant to the Enterprise Act 2002, Part II of the IA 86 has been replaced and a new Part II was inserted in its 
place, which gives effect to an additional Schedule B1.  
The law regulating prepack administration proceedings:  
 
A significant change introduced by the EA is the fact that it makes provision for two ‘out of 
court’ routes to administration. Under the old law, an administrator could only be appointed 
by an order of the court, on a petition by the company, its directors or any creditors. 2 
However, under the EA 2002, a company is able to enter administration not only by means of 
a court order but also by a) an appointment by a floating charge holder or b) an appointment 
by the company or its directors.  
 
The EA 2002 enables the holder of a floating charge to appoint an administrator, provided 
that their security has become enforceable3 and that their security interest relates to the whole 
or substantially the whole of the company’s property.4 The power to make an appointment 
must be specified by the instrument creating their security. 5  The second gateway to 
administration is by virtue of an appointment by the company or its directors. It could be 
argued that, although directors can often be held responsible for the company’s difficulties, 
nonetheless, the rationale for granting them expedited appointment rights is to provide 
incentives (in the form of ‘sticks and carrots’) for them to take drastic action, when the 
company is in crisis.6 It is noteworthy that, although the floating charge holder does not 
initiate this process, he is still given the opportunity to appoint his own administrator, unless 
the court thinks otherwise.7 In addition, the floating charge holder must receive at least five 
days’ notice of the company’s intention to appoint an administrator8 and no appointment may 
                                                          
2Section 9(1), Insolvency Act 1986. 
3 Paragraph 16, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
4 Ibid, paragraph 14 (3). 
5 Ibid, paragraph 14 (2). 
6 J. Armour, & R. Mokal, “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002” (2005) 
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, pp28-64, at p. 32. 
7 See paragraph 36, Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986. 
8 Ibid, paragraph 26 (1). 
be made until the notice period has expired or until the floating charge holder gives his 
written permission.9 
A remarkable change introduced by the EA is with regards to the purpose of administration.10 
The administrator must hierarchically perform his functions with the objective of ‘a) rescuing 
the company as a going concern, b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a 
whole than would be likely if the company were wound up or c) realizing property in order to 
make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors’.11  Additionally, the 
administrator must perform his functions ‘in the interests of the company’s creditors as a 
whole’12 and as ‘quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable’.13  In exercising his 
functions, the administrator acts as the company’s agent. 14  Upon his appointment, the 
administrator has the power to do anything necessary or expedient in relation to the 
management of the affairs, business or property of the company.15 For instance, he may 
challenge undervalue transactions, preferences, extortionate credit transactions and certain 
floating charges.16 
 
Further, the EA 2002 affords creditors enhanced participation in the administration 
proceedings. The Act requires the administrator to submit a statement of proposals for 
achieving the purpose of administration,17 which must be accompanied by an invitation to an 
                                                          
9 Ibid, paragraph 28. 
10 Phillips and Goldring argue that “this provision makes it expressly clear that administration is first and 
foremost about rescuing the corporate entity”, M. Phillips & J. Goldring, “Rescue and Reconstruction” (2002) 
15(10) Insolvency Intelligence, pp. 75-76, at p.76. 
11 Paragraph 3(1) a-c, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
12 Ibid, paragraph 3(2). 
13 Ibid, paragraph 4. 
14 Ibid, paragraph 69. 
15 Ibid, paragraph 59 (1). 
16 See sections 238,239,244 and 245, Insolvency Act 1986, respectively. 
17 Paragraph 49 (1), (3) & paragraph 49(4), (5), Insolvency Act 1986, which states that a copy of the proposals 
must be sent to all the members it applies to, no later than the end of 8 weeks from the commencement of 
administration. 
initial creditors’ meeting.18 However, no such meeting is necessary where the administrator 
believes that a) the company has sufficient property for each creditor to be paid in full;19 b) 
that the company has insufficient property to enable a distribution to be made to unsecured 
creditors other than by virtue of the statutory ring-fencing of fund for unsecured creditors;20 
or c) that none of the objectives for which the administration process was initiated can be 
achieved.21 Upon consideration of the proposals, the creditors can either approve or reject 
them. Additionally, the creditors may approve the proposals with modifications. However, 
the administrator must consent to each modification.22  Subsequently, if the administrator 
approves the proposed modifications and believes that they are substantial, he must call for a 
further meeting, where he will present the revised proposals or report any decisions to the 
creditors, and then report the matter to the court. 23  It should be pointed out that the 
requirement for administrators to set out proposals, which are in turn to be approved by the 
creditors at the creditors’ meeting, is designed to enhance creditor participation in the re-
organisation process. However, the objective of this requirement is arguably undermined by 
pre-packaged administrations, as, where such proceedings are involved, it is possible for the 
administrator to effect a prepack disposal of the company’s business, or a substantial part of it, 
prior to a creditors’ meeting.24 
 
Furthermore, although the administrator will consult with the company's secured creditors 
prior to a prepack (in fact it is impossible to give effect to a prepack sale without the bank’s 
support), it could be argued that the rights of less powerful creditors will be overridden. 
                                                          
18 Ibid, paragraph 51(1), also 51(2) states that the meeting must be held as soon as is reasonably practicable but 
not later than the end of 10 weeks from the commencement of the administration process. 
19 Paragraph 52 (1) (a), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
20 Ibid, para. 52 (1) (b). 
21Ibid, para. 52 (1) (c).  
22 Ibid, para. 51(3). 
23 Ibid, para 54. 
24 A more detailed analysis of the pre-packaged administration technique and criticism over its use is offered 
below. 
Frisby identifies that creditors' rights of participation are subjugated to commercial 
considerations in a prepack situation, and acknowledges that there is a strong possibility that 
the commercial advantages of a prepack, in the form of enhanced consideration for the 
business and a reduction in the costs of selling it, will probably not inure to the advantage of 
those creditors who are excluded from the decision-making process.25 
 
As mentioned earlier, the prepack is a restructuring method, whereby a sale is seamlessly 
prepared outside of formal insolvency proceedings, with a primary aim to preserve value. 
However, although the popularity of prepack has risen dramatically, the use of the procedure has 
not been free from criticism. In particular, it could be said that a significant criticism of the 
prepack process relates to the extent of control exerted by secured creditors, which arguably is 
not in line with the objectives of the Enterprise Act. An analysis of some of the key criticisms is 
offered below. 
 
Prepacks and the role of secured creditors in the process   
 
One of the key changes introduced by the Enterprise Act is the virtual abolition of the 
administrative receivership procedure, with the objective of replacing a somewhat ‘selfish’ 
proceeding with a somewhat more collective administration procedure. In other words it is no 
longer possible for a floating charge holder to appoint a receiver, who would primarily act in 
the interests of his appointor. Instead, following the reforms introduced by the Enterprise Act, 
the aim of which is to promote a more collective approach towards insolvency, the floating 
charge holder has an option to make an out of court appointment of an administrator,26 whose 
                                                          
25 S. Frisby, “Report on Insolvency Outcomes” (2006), p.72. Available at:  
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf
>. 
26 Paragraph 14(1), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
statutory duty to perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a 
whole.27   
It could be argued that although the legislature’s intention was to promote a more collective 
insolvency procedure than administrative receivership, the manner in which prepack 
administration operates in practice is such that it closely resembles the administrative 
receivership procedure, effectively reviving the abolished procedure. In particular, some 
critics argue that prepacks have effectively replaced administrative receivership, as the 
procedure of choice for the secured lender as appointor.28  
The aim of the Enterprise Act to promote corporate rescue and a collective approach towards 
insolvency is clearly reflected in paragraph 3 of Schedule B1 IA 86, where it is stated that 
‘the administrator of a company must perform his functions hierarchically with the objective 
of – 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
company were wound up (without first being in administration), or 
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential 
creditors. 
Therefore, with particular regard to the statutory purpose of administration, it could be argued 
that prepacks defy the intentions of the Act, as with a prepack the emphasis is no longer on 
rescuing the company as a going concern. Instead, since as part of a prepack sale an 
agreement to sell the business is concluded prior to the administrator’s formal appointment, it 
could be argued that a prepack fails to achieve the primary objective of administration. It is 
                                                          
27 Paragraph 3(2), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
28  S. Davies, “Pre-pack” (2006) Recovery (Summer) 16.  
therefore apparent that the prepack is designed to achieve either the second or third objective 
of administration, where the emphasis shifts to the protection of the secured creditors’ 
interests.    
Although it appears that prepacks undermine the statutory objectives of administration in 
practice and that the significant control exercised by secured lenders is retained post 
Enterprise Act, one could nevertheless argue that prepacks could in the right circumstances 
constitute the most appropriate course of action. For instance, in circumstances where an 
insolvent company cannot be sold as a going concern, the prepack constitutes a great ‘value-
preservation’ tool, as it facilitates a discreet and quick sale of the business. 29 In particular, the 
prepack could prove to be a very valuable tool where a business has a strong brand or 
intellectual property, the value of which could decrease dramatically by even a hint of a 
formal insolvency.30 Furthermore, a prepack minimises the erosion of customer confidence, 
reduces any damage to relationships with key employees, especially in service based 
companies.31   
Whilst there is a clear advantage to be gained from concealing the troubles of a company 
from the general public, where a prepack sale is involved, looking at the process from an 
apprehensive unsecured creditor’s perspective, it could be said that the lack of transparency 
within the prepack process makes it very difficult to determine how a deal was struck 
(arguably, the prepack-sceptic unsecured creditor is predisposed to believe that secrecy 
translates into a willy-nilly arrangement to benefit the secured creditors) and whether the 
administrator has properly conducted all the necessary enquiries as well as complied with his 
                                                          
29 The sale is negotiated and prepared prior to entering into formal administration proceedings and is executed 
immediately after the appointment of the practitioner. Therefore the process is quick and confidential and as a 
result the value of the business assets is preserved.  
30 M. Ellis, “The thin line in the sand: pre-packs and Phoenixes”, (2006) Recovery (Spring) 3.  
31 Davies, see note 28 above.  
statutory duties.32  Furthermore, whilst unsecured creditors would be kept in the dark, a 
prepack cannot be completed without the involvement of the secured creditors, often banks or 
other financial institutions. The debtor needs the secured creditor to provide a release on the 
encumbered assets or else they cannot be sold. The creditors on the other hand need the 
administration procedure to take recourse on their secured assets. Therefore, the secured 
creditors are always involved in the process, whereas unsecured creditors are not.  
 However, it is submitted that banks benefit from successful prepack proceedings and have 
interest to ensure that there has not been an abuse of process. In addition, although safeguards 
(such as the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16) are in place, so as to ensure that insolvency 
practitioners act in accordance with their duties, it is rather unlikely that an administrator 
would willingly jeopardise his reputation (and hence his livelihood) and risk losing his 
licence, so as to benefit a particular creditor.  
Furthermore, although prepacks appear to be a ‘controlled way forward’ for banks, one could 
argue that banks are very well-placed, due to their experience and vast range of resources, to 
provide advice on the viability of a rescue business plan and to positively influence the 
outcomes of a prepack administration proceeding. 33 It is submitted that banks benefit from 
successful prepack proceedings and have interest to ensure that there has not been an abuse of 
process. 
 
The lack of transparency which surrounds prepack administration gives rise to further 
criticisms relating particularly to the marketing and the valuation of the business prior to a 
sale. It could be argued that a proposed prepack sale is not subjected to the competitive forces 
of the market, which ultimately is likely to lead to the business or assets within the business 
                                                          
32 Importantly, the administrator must perform his functions in the interests of the company's creditors as a 
whole and as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable. 
33 In particular the London Approach suggests an influence on restructurings dating back to the 1970s. 
being sold at a value significantly lower than it would, had it been properly exposed to the 
market for an appropriate period. With particular regard to instances where the sale of the 
business is to a connected party, even where the deal offered by the connected party is the 
best one available in all the circumstances, unsecured creditors in particular perceive the sale 
to be inherently unfair. The Graham Report,34 which offered an overview of the criticised 
prepack elements and proposed reforms to improve the procedure, suggested that the creation  
of a ‘pool of independent experts’35 would effectively address problems raised by the limited 
marketing of the business and would provide extra checks and balances to the process. The 
Graham report recommends that in connected sales, the connected party should voluntarily 
take the opportunity to present outline of the deal, together with the reasons why it is 
necessary to proceed in a particular way to an independent member of the ‘pool’ prior to 
administration.  This would create independent scrutiny of the sale, whilst retaining the much 
desired secrecy before the event. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the creation of a pool 
of experts only partly addresses the issue of limited marketing of a business, as it only applies 
to the case of a sale to a connected party. In addition, in the case of connected sales, it 
remains to be seen as to whether or not the creation of a pool of experts will operate 
effectively or instead add to the existing ‘comply or explain’ bureaucracy insolvency 
practitioners are faced with. Finally, one has to question whether the Graham report 
recommendation will serve its genuine purpose or simply amount to a mechanism that 
alleviates insolvency practitioners from liability. 
 
The Dutch pre-pack: an alternative on the rise? 
 
                                                          
34 T. Graham, ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration June 2014’, Report to the Honourable Vince Cable 
MP. 
35 The ‘pool of experts’ became operational on 2 November 2015. 
As part of the revision of the Dutch Insolvency Act, the Dutch have introduced a legislative 
framework for their prepack practice in the Wet Continuïteit Ondernemingen I.36  The Dutch 
prepack derives from English practice, but is different on many levels. 
In the Netherlands the prepack falls within the context of the “faillissements” procedure 
(hereafter: liquidation), which focuses on the winding up of the company. However, in 
practice the liquidation procedure is also used as the most important instrument for the 
reorganisation and continuation of businesses in financial difficulties.37  A big advantage of 
this procedure can be found in the rules governing employment contracts. Importantly, since 
the liquidation procedure is aimed at the winding up of the company, the Acquired Rights 
Directive (hereafter: ARD)38 excludes the automatic transfer of employment contracts upon 
the transfer of the business.39 
Though at first sight the Dutch Insolvency Act (hereafter: ‘DIA’) does not seem very rescue-
orientated, the liquidation procedure can be used quite effectively for restructuring purposes. 
The liquidation procedure gives two possible routes for the continuation of the business or 
company. First there is an option for liquidation compositions. The liquidation composition 
must be offered to all ordinary creditors who can adopt the proposal by a simple majority that 
together represent at least half of the debts.40 The proposal often consists of an offer to 
partially pay the debts after which the total amount of these debts will be discharged.41 A 
major advantage of this procedure is the court approval and the binding on a dissenting 
minority of ordinary creditors. After the court approval the liquidation procedure comes to an 
end without liquidating the company (Article 161 DIA). Therefore, the liquidation 
                                                          
36 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 34 218, 2. 
37 N.E.D. Faber and others (eds), Commencement of Insolvency Proceedings (2012, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford), p. 427. 
38 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001. 
39 Article 5 (1) ARD; Article 7:666 section 1 Dutch Civil Code (hereafter : ‘DCC’). 
40 Articles 138 and 145 DIA; an exception can be made under the conditions mentioned in Article 146 DIA. 
41 Groenewegen and Van Buren-Dee, Tekst & Commentaar Insolventierecht (2014, Kluwer, Deventer), art. 138 
DIA, aant. 4. 
composition gives the possibility to restructure the debts within the same legal entity. 42 
However, these liquidation procedures are used very rarely in practice. The fact that the 
composition only works against the unsecured creditors is a major drawback.43  
 
The second route involves the asset transaction in liquidation, also known as ‘restarts’. The 
Dutch prepack derives from such restarts. As part of a restart the assets of a company are sold 
followed by the liquidation of the corporate entity as an ‘empty shell’.44 The big advantages 
of this asset sale by the trustee are the speed of the procedure and the privacy of the sale.45 In 
contrast to the composition plan, the asset sale does not require public voting at a creditors’ 
meeting. The consent of the supervisory judge is required and so is the permission of key 
secured creditors to sell the encumbered assets which are secured by their security rights.46 
Most restarts of business are based upon these asset transactions followed by liquidation.  
 
The lack of transparency that surrounds the prepack process is often criticised both the in UK 
and the Netherlands. Particularly, the concerns in the UK are focussed on ‘connected party 
sales’, the potential conflict of interest of an insolvency practitioner, as well as the lack of 
involvement of the unsecured creditors. Instead, in the Netherlands the main concern has 
been the applicability of the ARD. 
As part of the proposed Dutch prepack, a debtor who approaches insolvency, but is not yet 
insolvent,47 can request the court to appoint an intended trustee. This intended trustee is an 
insolvency practitioner who is likely to be appointed as trustee in case of impeding 
                                                          
42 J.A.A. Adriaanse, Restructuring in the shadow of the law: Informal reorganisation in the Netherlands (2005, 
Kluwer, Deventer), p.16. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 L. Kortmann, “Improved pre-packs: going Dutch”, (2012) Corporate Rescue and Insolvency, p. 225. 
46 Ibid, p. 226. 
47 Proposed article 363 sub 1 DIA; The debtor may not yet be insolvent since he has to be able to pay the salary 
of the intended trustee as well as the debts that fall due in short term. 
liquidation proceedings. 48  Following the debtor’s request, it must be proven that the 
appointment of the intended trustee will provide “added value”. Added value can be shown in 
at least two cases: when the debtor can show that the preparation by an intended trustee can 
limit the damage for the stakeholders in the case of a potential liquidation procedure, or when 
he can show that the preparation in secrecy can increase the value and job preservation to 
such an extent that this preservation outweighs the fact that the preparation is conducted in 
secrecy and lacks certain aspects of transparency.49 Where the court is convinced that added 
value is present, an intended trustee can be appointed for a maximum of two weeks. 50 
Furthermore, the court can make the appointment of the intended trustee subject to certain 
conditions, such as the involvement of the representatives of the employees or the unions.51 
 
The role of unsecured creditors in prepacks 
 
In most prepacks unsecured creditors are ‘out of the money’ and receive very little, if 
anything at all, from the empty shell distributions.52 The statutory priority of claims in respect 
of distributions in insolvency places the unsecured creditors almost at the bottom of the list 
both in the UK and the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands the intended trustee and the intended supervisory judge are involved in the 
process to supervise the debtor and ensure that the interests of the unsecured creditors and 
employees are not neglected.53 Since most of the creditors are not involved in the preparation 
process, the responsibility on the intended trustee and intended supervisory judge is even 
                                                          
48 Proposed article 363 sub 1 first sentence DIA. 
49 Proposed article 363 sub 1 third sentence DIA. 
50 Proposed article 363 sub 3 DIA. For the extension of the period the debtor has to prove once again that the 
appointment will have added value. Before the extension of the period, the court will hear the intended trustee 
and the intended supervisory judge. 
51 Proposed article 363 sub 4 DIA; Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 34 218, 3, at 14 (MvT). 
52 ‘Out of the money’ meaning that after the expenses and return to the preferential and secured creditors, there 
will be no return for the unsecured creditors. 
53 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 34 218, 3, at 7 (MvT). 
greater than would be in the event of an ‘ordinary’ liquidation procedure.54 The intended 
trustee and intended supervisory judge must ensure that the interests of all affected parties are 
taken into account and this is very significant as unsecured creditors and employees are not 
involved in the process. In addition to the interests of creditors as a whole, the intended 
trustee should keep in mind the ‘interest of the society as a whole’, which could include 
preservation of employment knowledge and the productivity.55  
 
The role of secured creditors in prepacks 
 
Secured creditors have a very significant role to play in the prepack process both in the UK 
and the Netherlands. However, neither the Graham Report nor the Dutch proposed legislation 
explicitly examine the role that might be played by secured creditors in a prepack.56  
It has been argued that it is the degree of certainty and control for the secured creditors in a 
prepack that makes the procedure so attractive and successful.57 It could be argued that, as 
long as key lenders, such as the banks, do not suffer too much from the insolvency of the 
company, they are quite keen on keeping the lending in place for the NewCo.58 It stands out 
that most of the critical literature is focused on the lack of transparency or the role of the 
unsecured creditors and it seems that the role played by the secured creditors is relatively 
untouched. 
Contrary to the position in the UK, an out of court appointment of an intended trustee is not 
possible in the Netherlands. This could indicate that there might be less influence of the 
secured creditors on the insolvency practitioner. Moreover, the Dutch proposed prepack 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, p. 18. 
56 ‘Secured creditors’ and ‘banks’ will be used as exchangeable terms from here on. 
57 S. Harris, “The Decision to Pre-Pack” (2004) Recovery (Winter),  p. 27. 
58 W.E. Moojen, “Banken ook bij pre-pack bepalend voor uitkomst” FD 18 September 2014. 
cannot be commenced by any party other than the debtor himself.59 However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the banks will not have influence in the process. The banks in the 
Netherlands that have security rights on the assets of the debtor will have a position as a 
‘separatist’ in liquidation procedures. 60  This essentially means that, at any moment of 
default, either during or outside liquidation, the pledgees and mortgagees may exercise their 
rights as if it there was no liquidation procedure.61 They may exercise these foreclosure rights 
without having to obtain a court approved enforcement order. This provides the secured 
creditor with a very strong bargaining position, since the debtor and trustee will always have 
the threat of the secured creditor taking recourse at the assets when the debtor is in default. 
The secured creditor thereby has the possibility to block the going concern sale of the 
business.62 Moreover, post-petition financing shall only be provided by these banks if they 
are optimistic about the continuation of the business. Therefore, it can be argued that there is 
in fact little power in the hands of the debtor or the trustee.63 It should be noted that the banks 
are within the group that have expressed their support in the development of the Dutch 
prepack.64  
It has been stated that the reason that banks have so much influence is that the Dutch as well 
as the English businesses are often over-collateralised.65 The process of over-collateralisation 
essentially entails the posting of more collateral than is needed to obtain or secure financing. 
Therefore, the banks will have security on (almost) everything owned by the debtor and when 
the insolvency of a debtor occurs, it is the secured creditor who obtains almost everything and 
very little, if any, is left for the unsecured creditors. Banks often prefer to provide the NewCo 
                                                          
59 It is of course possible that banks will exercise pressure on the debtor to start a procedure.  
60 Article 57 DIA. 
61 Articles 3:248; 3:268 DCC and Article 57 DIA. 
62 J.M. Hummelen, “Het verkoopproces in een pre-packaged activatransactie” (2015) 2 TvI, p. 14. 
63 J.H.S.G.K. Timmermans, ‘De curator en het boedelkrediet’ in: J.G. Princen and A. van der Schee (eds), De 
ondernemende curator (2011, Kluwer, Deventer) p. 68.  
64 M.H.F. van Vught, “De Nederlandse pre-pack: time-out, please!” (2014) 1 F.I.P. 26, p. 26. 
65 Moojen, note 58 above. 
with credit when this offers perspective that their full loan will be repaid in the future. With 
the intensive care departments of banks, permanent control is kept on the loans and finance of 
the debtors. It can be questioned what the consequences of these high stakes and over-
collateralisation are for the influence of the banks in the prepack. 
 
An essential part of the prepack in both the UK and the Netherlands is the continuation of 
finance after the liquidation or administration procedure has started. It seems that, as long as 
the banks receive (almost) all of their outstanding credit out of the business sale, they are 
willing to continue financing in the NewCo.66 Without this new credit from either the secured 
creditor or a new investor, the NewCo will be doomed to fail. It has been argued that, because 
the banks are willing to continue the financing as long as their debts are fulfilled, the 
purchaser will be able to buy the assets at ‘rock-bottom’ value and nothing will be left for the 
unsecured creditors.67 As long as a purchaser is found and the secured creditor is satisfied, it 
is likely that insolvency practitioner will agree with the sale.68  
 
If one compares the position of the separatist in the Netherlands to the floating charge 
holder’s in the UK, it can be argued that the Dutch secured creditors have a more powerful 
position. The Dutch secured creditors may simply ignore the liquidation procedure and 
enforce their foreclosure right without using the court or a formal insolvency procedure.69 
However, there is the possibility of a moratorium for the maximum period of four months 
ordered by the supervisory judge.70 In this period the secured creditors will not be allowed to 
take recourse to the assets of the debtor without the approval of the supervisory judge. In 
                                                          
66 C. Mallon and S.Y. Waisman (eds), The Law and practice of restructuring in the UK and US (2011, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford), pp.237-238. 
67 Moojen, note 58 above. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Article 57 DIA. 
70 Article 63a DIA. 
neither of the jurisdictions the prepack can be executed without the release of the banks. In 
the UK, the enforcement of the floating charge has to be executed via the administration 
procedure, giving the banks a major degree of leverage in both jurisdictions. One could say 
that the banks in the UK have a major influence on the prepack since an out of court 
administrator is often appointed at the prompting of the banks. However, the banks strive to 
avoid being directly associated with a failed company. Therefore, it will most likely be the 
company or directors that appoint the administrator, albeit at the prompting of the banks. In 
the Netherlands on the other hand, the banks have a very strong position and a lot of 
influence in the process as separatist. However, the court, intended supervisory judge and 
intended trustee are involved in the procedure to provide the necessary checks and balances. 
However, in general, the blessing of the banks is required in both jurisdictions since the 
secured creditors have to release their assets for the sale. Therefore, a prepack seems to be 
impossible in the UK as well as the Netherlands without the blessing of the secured creditors.  
 
It has been argued that the fact that under the proposed Dutch legislation it is the debtor, and 
no one else who can request for the appointment of an intended trustee, can be seen as an 
advantage over the English procedure. 71  Where the English out of court appointed 
administrator might create the perception of a bias towards the secured creditors or 
management, the Dutch intended trustee is court appointed and subject to control of the 
intended supervisory judge. This difference in manner of appointment and the degree of court 
control can create the perception that the Dutch intended trustee is less biased. However, the 
secured creditor will always be at the table together with the debtor, purchaser and insolvency 
practitioner.72 Neither in the UK nor in the Netherlands the position of the secured creditor is 
subject to much discussion at the moment. The qualified floating charge holder in the UK has 
                                                          
71 P.J. Frölich, “Redding en sanering: monomaan of modern paradigma? Over de pre-pack en dergelijke” (2015) 
AA 192, p. 197. 
72 J.M. Hummelen, “Het verkoopproces in een pre-packaged activatransactie” (2015) 2 TvI, p. 14. 
an important role to play through the out of court appointment of the administrator and the 
post-petition financing of the debtor. The Dutch secured creditors will always be involved at 
a certain stage of the process since they have the possibility to take recourse on the assets at 
any moment of default. Without the consent of the banks, there is no way the debtor will be 
able to sell the assets, let alone the business in a prepack. The first and far most reason being 
that in both jurisdictions the secured creditor has to provide a release in respect of the assets 
being sold.73 In combination with the over-collateralisation, this means that the bank will 
have to provide a release on (almost) all assets of the debtor. Therefore, the banks will always 
be involved in the process. 
 
It seems that it is in fact ‘he who pays the piper that calls the tune’.74 The prepack provides 
the banks with an assured return and a high level of influence in the procedure.75 It can be 
argued that banks exert significant control over prepack sales and it is highly unlikely that a 
sale could be given effect in the absence of the secured creditors’ support.76 Nevertheless, as 
argued above, although banks have a vested interest to ensure that a prepack sale is 
successfully completed; at the same time it is in their best interests to ensure that there is no 
abuse of process and that the legality of the prepack process shall not be questioned.   
 
A comparison of the Anglo-Dutch prepack 
  
The economic crisis has prompted a move towards a more debtor friendly oriented 
insolvency regime in the European Union. The concept of rescue itself is being revisited77 
and business rescue is ranked at the top of the European insolvency law related agenda. The 
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European Commission published a recommendation on a new approach to business failure 
and insolvency ‘to encourage Member States to put in place a framework that enables the 
efficient restructuring of viable enterprises in financial difficulty’ and to ‘give honest 
entrepreneurs a second chance’.78 The Dutch have followed this route set out by the European 
Union and are moving their insolvency regime from the traditional ‘pay what you owe’ 
towards ‘business rescue’ by introducing the prepack in their insolvency regime.79 With the 
prepack, the Dutch are introducing a procedure that is already heavily criticised in the 
country of origin.  
 
A prepack procedure in the UK cannot be completed without the involvement of the secured 
creditors, often banks or other financial institutions. The debtor needs the secured creditor to 
provide a release on the encumbered assets or else they cannot be sold. The creditors on the 
other hand need the administration procedure to take recourse on their secured assets. 
Therefore, the secured creditors are always involved in the process. A ‘prepack pool’ 
comprised of independent experts, as recommended in the Graham Report, might provide 
extra checks and balances to the process.80  
 
The Dutch prepack is essentially an adapted version of the asset transaction in liquidation, 
also known as a ‘restart’. In the practice of an ordinary restart, the debtor will prepare the sale 
of the business, together with his own advisors, before filing for “faillissement”. In the 
proposed prepack, the debtor has the opportunity to formally involve an intended trustee and 
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an intended supervisory judge in the process of preparing the business sale. 81  Since the 
intended trustee and intended supervisory judge are involved early in the preparation, they 
will not be confronted with a prepared asset transaction at the moment of the formal 
appointment as trustee and supervisory judge in liquidation. 
 
The Dutch intended trustee is court appointed and therefore it can be argued that his 
independence is guaranteed.82 The appearance of a biased trustee might therefore not, or at 
least to a lesser degree than in the UK, be part of the Dutch procedure. However, the Dutch 
secured creditors do have a powerful position in the prepack because of their position as 
separatist. The secured creditors in the Netherlands can take recourse to their encumbered 
assets as if there is no liquidation procedure. To protect the intended trustee and the debtor 
from the powerful secured creditors, the Dutch intended trustees are appointed by the court 
and the secured creditors do not have influence on the appointment itself or on the person 
who is going to be assigned as intended trustee. The intended trustee is supervised by the 
intended supervisory judge from the moment of appointment and his appointment can be 
made subject to certain conditions.  
 
Finally, a key difference between the Dutch and the UK prepack is in relation to the 
protection of employment contracts and in particular, the application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive (ARD).83  Although it could be argued that it is difficult to facilitate corporate 
rescue through a prepack and at the same time protect the employees' interests, one of the 
main justifications in favour of the prepack in the UK is the fact that it often results in the 
preservation of jobs. In fact, SIP 16 statements cite the preservation of jobs as one of the 
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primary reasons to prepack. Furthermore, in the early case of DKLL84 the court expressed its 
support, or at least accepted that there is a legal justification for the prepack process, 
primarily because of its effect on preservation of employment. Furthermore, the Graham 
report85 found that in most cases (almost) all jobs are preserved after the use of a prepack.  
Although, the prospect of administration or liquidation is rarely well conceived by the 
employees, it might nevertheless be comforting for English employees that the prepacks do 
not constitute insolvency proceedings within the meaning of the ARD, effectively meaning 
that the protection afforded to employment protection rights under the ARD, applies to the 
prepacks.86 
 
The Dutch on the other hand, have taken a different view with regard to the applicability of 
the ARD on their procedure. Although the best practice rules of Insolad87 and the explanatory 
memorandum also point out the possible preservation of jobs as a justification for the 
prepack,88 the applicability of the ARD was subject to a lot of discussion in the period of 
drafting the Dutch legislation. It has been argued that the ARD provisions do not apply to the 
prepack.89 Since what will happen to the undertaking (i.e. continuation or dissolution) only 
becomes apparent after the company entered into the liquidation procedure in a prepack 
procedure, Articles 7:662-7:666 DCC implementing the ARD do not apply to the proposed 
prepack procedure.90  
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A decision has to be reached in the Netherlands as to whether the procedure is aimed at 
liquidation or at the continuation of the business.91 In the English administration procedure 
this distinction only becomes apparent when the administrator declares what statutory objects 
he is following. Since the outcome only becomes apparent when the proposals are filed, the 
Court has opted for an ‘absolute’ rather than a ‘fact based’ approach in order to increase the 
legal certainty and ensure the easy approach of the procedure. It was held in OTG92 that the 
line between the procedures aimed at liquidation and at continuation in the UK is a less clear 
cut than the difference between liquidation and suspension of payments in the Netherlands.93  
 
The UK court chose the ‘absolute’ approach because it is otherwise too difficult to take a 
‘fact based’ approach in determining the outcome of every different case.94 One could argue 
that such an absolute approach should also be applied in the Netherlands and that therefore 
the ARD should not apply to any case of liquidation. However, when one looks at the Dutch 
liquidation procedure, the ‘fact based’ result will be different from the formal goal of the 
liquidation procedure in many cases, especially prepacks. Looking at the Dutch practice and 
the possibilities for a trustee, most of the time the liquidation procedure is the only 
possibility, within the insolvency laws, to truly achieve corporate rescue. The suspension of 
payment procedure has not proven to be a successful restructuring mechanism. This does not 
mean that every time the liquidation procedure is used, it is used to restart the company. It is 
however not uncommon that the liquidation of the company (the corporate shell) is the result, 
but the procedure was in fact aimed at the rescue of the business and not the liquidation of the 
company.  
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Conclusion 
 
In light of the significantly different treatment of employees’ rights in insolvency in the two 
creditor-friendly jurisdictions, one cannot fail but to consider the possibility of whether or not 
such critical differences shall put the Netherlands on the map as a worthy competitor of the 
traditionally attractive and successful UK prepack regime95 and whether the inapplicability of 
the ARD in the Netherlands will result into more restructurings taking place in the 
Netherlands and in an increase of insolvent companies shifting their centre of main interests 
there. Arguably, it remains to be seen whether or not the Dutch prepack will prove to be a key 
competitor of the UK prepack. Without a doubt, the UK has been proven to be a very 
attractive restructuring destination in the past, so it remains to be seen whether the fact that 
the Dutch prepack enables the debtor to evade the protection rights afforded to employees 
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Interestingly, the forum shopping of big enterprises towards the UK has been identified by the Graham report as 
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